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Abstract
This paper explores the problem of a social planner willing to improve the
welfare of individuals who are unable to compare all available alternatives. The
optimal decision trades oﬀ the individuals’ desire for ﬂexibility versus their aver-
sion towards ambiguous choice situations. We introduce an axiom system that
formalizes this idea. Our main result characterizes the preference maximizing
opportunity set. It is a maximal set that consists of mutually comparable alterna-
tives. It also has the property that it maximizes the sum of the distances between
its ordered elements for some appropriate metric imposed on the set of possible
choices.
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11 Introduction
The standard result that rational decision-makers should prefer larger opportunity sets
is implied by the assumption of a preference relation that admits the comparison of all
possible alternatives at no cost. Although the existence of such a preference relation
may be unquestionable in situations where there are few alternatives that are easily
comparable, its assumption strikes us as quite counterintuitive in situations in which a
vast amount of alternatives must be compared according to multiple criteria. In such
situations, a decision-maker might prefer to trade-oﬀ a larger opportunity set against a
smaller one that includes fewer incomparable alternatives.
In this paper, we model preferences over opportunity sets under the assumptions
that, ﬁrst, the decision-maker is unable to compare all available alternatives, either ex
ante or ex post; second, the decision-maker perceives any ex post restriction of his ex
ante chosen menu through forces of nature as possible. The ﬁrst assumption is captured
by an incomplete preference relation over alternatives, which is known in advance and,
therefore, deterministic. Combined with a strong aversion of the decision-maker against
making choices between incomparable alternatives – which we call strong ambiguity
aversion – incomplete preferences imply that the decision-maker will express prefer-
ences for smaller opportunity sets, preferring menus that do not contain incomparable
alternatives. In contrast, the second assumption forces the individual to express pref-
erences for ﬂexibility: since nature may eliminate the best element out of the initially
chosen menu, it is preferable to choose an opportunity set that also contains the second
best alternative given the restrictions imposed by nature.
As our main contribution we explore the question of how a welfare-maximizing social
planner optimally restricts opportunity sets. For this purpose we impose axioms on
preferences over opportunity sets and derive a characterization theorem stating that
• Any preference maximizing opportunity set must be a maximizer of a utility func-
tion that sums up the distances between its ordered elements for some appropriate
metric imposed on the set of alternatives;
• Conversely, if an opportunity set maximizes a utility function that sums up the dis-
tances between its ordered elements for an arbitrary metric, then this opportunity
set is considered optimal for some preference ordering satisfying our axioms.
Our axiom system models the trade-oﬀ between preferences for ﬂexibility and ambi-
guity aversion in a very special way. The decision-maker we have in mind considers any
set containing incomparable alternatives to be inferior to some set on which the prefer-
ence relation is complete. Hence, sets containing incomparable alternatives can never be
2an optimal choice. Moreover, the incompleteness of preferences, which is not resolved
ex post, does not allow for a meaningful representation of preferences by an expected
utility functional. The preference for ﬂexibility further implies that the decision-maker
prefers a maximal set out of those on which the preference relation is complete.
To give an example: Consider a college graduate who has to decide on the
set of PhD programs to which to apply. On the one hand, there is the worst
case scenario where the student is not admitted to any PhD program he had
applied to. On the other hand, the student might be simultaneously admitted
to a large number of PhD programs to the eﬀect that he has problems to
make up his mind. Suppose, for instance, that any of his alternatives are
characterized by two sets of features:
Λ := prestige × tuition × scholarship
Γ := pressure to perform.
While the student may ﬁnd it easy to compare diﬀerent values of λ ∈ Λ,
let us assume that he encounters diﬃculties to compare diﬀerent values of
γ ∈ Γ, i.e., the pressure to perform. Possible reasons for this might be that
the prospective PhD student is unsure about his own abilities or that he
is ambivalent towards working under pressure: on the one hand, he enjoys
proving himself in a competitive environment, on the other hand, he would
physically suﬀer from the stress. As a consequence, it might be diﬃcult for
him to decide between PhD programs that diﬀer in their pressure to perform.
When such a student decides on the set of PhD programs to which to apply,
he must therefore take into account the following trade-oﬀ: while applying to
a large number of PhD programs increases the chances of being admitted, it
also increases the likelihood of being caught in an ambiguous choice situation
where he is faced with several incomparable oﬀe r st oc h o o s ef r o m .
For the above example, our axiomatic approach suggests that a student who is ambi-
guity averse will choose to apply to a set of PhD programs which are well ordered with
respect to his preferences and will avoid sets containing incomparable alternatives. Even
more relevantly, our approach also suggests that there might be positive welfare eﬀects of
real-life institutions that eﬀectively restrict choice-sets. For example, in many countries
(e.g., Bulgaria, Germany) the application to colleges is centralized whereby prospective
students are asked to list the colleges they wish to apply in the order of their preferences.
Usually, there is no limit on how many choices a prospective student is allowed to make,
3but the ordering has to be unambiguous. This institution, hence, forces applicants to
choose a set of comparable colleges. After the ranking of the applicants has been deter-
mined, assigning to each prospective student the best choice according to his preferences
which is consistent with the ranking is optimal from the point of view of each student.1
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship
of our approach to the existing psychologic and economic literature. In section 3, we
deﬁne our central concepts of strong ambiguity aversion and ﬂexibility of choice. Sec-
tion 4 introduces our main technical assumption of cancellation and presents an additive
representation result. Our main result is derived in section 5 where we characterize pref-
erence maximizing opportunity sets as maximizers of a speciﬁc utility representation. In
section 6 we illustrate our formal results for a speciﬁc class of preferences over alterna-
tives exhibiting a comparable as well as an incomparable component. We conclude in
section 7.
2 Related literature
Our approach is motivated by the psychological literature on choice-behavior while our
formalism is closely related to models in the economic literature on preferences for ﬂex-
ibility and preferences for commitment. Furthermore, we contribute to the decision-
theoretic literature on behavioral consequences of incomplete preferences.
The psychological literature provides evidence for the trade-oﬀ between larger and
smaller choice sets. Larger sets are found to have motivating power on individual behav-
ior and to reduce anxiety. Smaller sets instead reduce the complexity of decisions and
ensure that alternatives can be meaningfully compared. While experiments, in which
t h en u m b e ro fa l t e r n a t i v e si sr e l a t i v e l ys m a l l( 2 - 6 ) ,s u p p o r tt h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tm o r ea l -
ternatives improve the well-being of the individual (cf. Deci, 1975, 1981; Deci and Ryan,
1985), a signiﬁcant increase in the number of possible alternatives (up to 30) may make
the individual worse oﬀ. Subjects in experiments tend to make suboptimal decisions,
delay making choices and feel regret over the choices actually made (see Shaﬁr, Simon-
son and Tversky (1993), Kahneman and Tversky (1984), Iyengar and Lepper (2000),
(2002)). Most of this literature is concerned with choices that do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
the well-being of an individual (e.g. choices among diﬀerent types of jam or chocolate).
Surprisingly, similar eﬀects also seem to be present when people are facing decisions of
signiﬁcant importance, as, e.g., the choice of a retirement saving plan. Iyengar, Jiang
1Using the Gale-Shapley (1962) mechanism to match students with schools would insure that
prospective students have no incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
4and Huberman (2004) demonstrate that employees are more willing to contribute to a
pension scheme if less options are presented to them.
Some of the experiments (cf. Iyengar and Lepper, 2000) show that people tend to
exhibit dynamic inconsistency: subjects in experiments prefer a larger choice set ex ante
despite the regret they experience after the choice has been made. In face of this empiri-
cal evidence, our axiomatization of preferences over opportunity sets can be viewed as a
model of a decision-maker who behaves sequentially rational (=behaviorally consistent in
the terminology of Karni and Safra, 1990), anticipating the dissatisfaction resulting from
a choice out of a large opportunity set and, therefore, wishes to restrict his opportunities
ex ante. On the other hand, one might assume that bounded foresight is by large present
in human decisions and view the model presented below as axiomatizing the decision
of a social planner willing to correct the eﬀects of boundedly rational behavior. Thaler
and Sunstein (2003) argue in favor of such corrections termed “libertarian paternalism”:
a social planner must at times restrict the choices available to individuals, while still
allowing for suﬃcient ﬂexibility of choice.
In a seminal contribution to the economic theory on preferences over opportunity sets,
Kreps (1979) considers a two-stage decision situation where the decision-maker chooses
in period 1 some opportunity set from which he may pick, in period 2, some alternative.
In Kreps’ approach the decision-maker exhibits preferences for ﬂexibility because he is
ex ante (period 1) uncertain about his ex post (period 2) preferences over alternatives.
While Kreps obtains a representation result where some implicit states of the world
appear as part of the representation – but not as part of the set-up for decision-making
under uncertainty – Nehring (1999) describes preferences for ﬂexibility in a Savage
(1954) framework where states of the world are explicitly given in the set-up in order
to capture uncertainty about future opportunity sets. Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(2001) extend Kreps’ model by additionally allowing for preferences for commitment.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) describe preferences over opportunity sets which
trade-oﬀ ad e s i r ef o rﬂexibility against a desire for reducing the number of alternatives
in opportunity sets, which is similar to our approach. Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini
(2001) do not themselves develop possible explanations for a desire for commitment.
They rather refer to existing approaches in the literature which explain a desire for
commitment either by dynamic inconsistencies, e.g. Strotz (1954), Laibson (1997), so
that a commitment may improve the strategic situation of an ex ante decision-maker
who plays a game with his future selves, or by the desire to avoid temptations, (cf. Gul
and Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004). For instance, a decision-maker of their model might have
to choose a restaurant before knowing his preferences over diﬀerent meals in advance.
On the one hand, he would prefer to have a richer opportunity set, on the other hand, if
5he is, say, on a diet, he might express the desire to avoid the appearance of certain kinds
of food on the menu which he considers unhealthy though tempting. However, once a
particular restaurant is chosen, the preferences of the decision-maker become known and
he selects the best alternative out of the menu.
Our approach diﬀers from this literature on preferences over opportunity sets in sev-
eral respects. First, there is no uncertainty in our model about the decision-maker’s ex
post preferences but rather we presume, similar to Nehring (1999), that there is uncer-
tainty about the moves of nature which may eﬀectively restrict the alternatives available
to the decision-maker in period 2. As a consequence, we have a clear characterization of
the state space that captures all aspects of uncertainty in our model. Unlike the models
of Kreps (1979), Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2001),
i no u rm o d e l ,t h eb e s ta l t e r n a t i v em i g h tn o tb eu n i q u e l yd e ﬁn e di np e r i o d2f o re a c h
realized state of nature and each opportunity set chosen in period 1. This is a direct
consequence of the incompleteness of preferences over alternatives. As a consequence, we
cannot proceed as in this literature where ex ante preferences over opportunity sets are
aggregated from ex post preferences determining the best alternatives in each state of
the world. On the other hand, we do not wish to simply circumvent this incompleteness
problem by stipulating, as in Nehring (1999), that ex post preferences are deﬁned over
opportunity sets rather than over best alternatives belonging to those ex post realized
opportunity sets. Our proposal instead applies the Savage (1954) framework in order to
motivate our main axioms of ﬂexibility of choice and strong ambiguity aversion whereby
we consider states in which best alternatives exist. Nevertheless, the application of the
Savage framework is not suﬃcient here in order to completely determine ex ante pref-
erences over opportunity sets since comparisons of diﬀerent consequences at the same
state may be impossible. We, therefore, impose our main technical axiom, cancella-
tion, directly on preferences over opportunity sets without referring to a sophisticated
decision-maker who is able to compare the consequences of his actions across diﬀerent
states so that his preferences may reveal his likelihood considerations.
Our motivation for a desire for commitment by the wish to avoid ambiguous choice
situations is new to the economic literature. As Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) – and
unlike Strotz (1956), Laibson (1997) or Ludwig and Zimper (2006) – we do not pre-
sume dynamic inconsistencies. However, our motivation of preferences for commitment
also diﬀers greatly from Gul and Pesendorfer’s temptation-driven preferences. Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001) introduce an axiom called set betweenness, which implies temptation-
driven preferences. This axiom requires that for any two sets D º E,
D º D ∪ E º E.
This axiom is violated by our assumption of strong ambiguity aversion whenever the
6individual can not unambiguously evaluate his opportunities. To see this, suppose that
each of the sets D and E contains only mutually comparable alternatives, but for each
alternative a in D there is an alternative b in E such that a and b are incompara-
ble. Then, under our assumption of strong ambiguity aversion, the decision-maker will
strictly prefer each of the unambiguous sets E and D to their union. Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini (2004) provide examples which cast doubt on the appropriateness of set
betweenness to capture temptation-driven preferences and propose a diﬀerent axiom,
desire for commitment. This axiom requires that for every set D, there is an element
a ∈ Dsuch that
{a}ºD.
This axiom is inconsistent with the assumption of ﬂexibility of choice, which we impose
and which requires that larger unambiguous sets are preferred to smaller ones.
Finally, our approach contributes to the literature on incomplete preferences which
tries to ﬁnd behavioral implications of incomplete preferences and distinguish them from
the case of indiﬀerence. Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2004) suggest that incompleteness
of preferences can be traced back to lack of information about the alternatives to be
compared. Under this interpretation, the decision-maker will prefer to postpone his
decision and will strictly prefer the choice set consisting of two alternatives to each of
the singleton sets. Similarly to Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2004), Eliaz and Ok (2006)
also assume that indecisiveness is characterized by selecting multiple alternatives. In
contrast to this literature, we take incompleteness of preferences as a persisting feature
which does not - necessarily - depend on acquiring additional information. Furthermore,
our framework allows a distinction between preferences for ﬂexibility and incomplete
preferences on the one hand and between incompleteness and indiﬀerence, on the other
hand.
3 Ambiguity averse preferences over opportunity sets
The key to our axiomatic approach is the presumption of two diﬀerent preference re-
lations: on the one hand, the weak preference relation wA over alternatives in a ﬁnite
set A; on the other hand, the weak preference relation º over opportunity sets, i.e., all
non-empty subsets of A. The decision-making process is as follows: in a ﬁrst step a
decision-maker is allowed to choose any subset D of Aaccording to º. After that nature
selects another subset of A,s a yE, which constrains the initial choice of the individual.
Hence, the decision-maker can now only choose among the alternatives contained in
D ∩ E, which he does according to his preferences wA. We stipulate that there always
exists a worst element o ∈ D ∩ E. That is, neither the decision-maker’s choice nor a
7move by nature can exclude o from the alternatives being ex post available. A possible
interpretation of o would be the decision-maker’s death2,w h i c hm i g h ta l w a y sh a p p e ni n
t h ee xp o s ts i t u a t i o n :e i t h e rb yam o v eo fn a ture or by the decision-maker’s own hand.
We assume that the decision-maker perceives any subset E ⊆ A such that o ∈ E as a
possible move of nature. Furthermore, we presume that the decision-maker’s preferences
wA over alternatives in A as well as preferences º over opportunity sets are identical in
the ex ante and in the ex post situation, that is, before and after the individual learns
how nature eﬀectively restricts his possible choices.
Assumption 1: There exists a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation wA over the
elements in the set A. A contains a worst alternative o,w h e r eo ≺A a, for all
a ∈ A.
By assumption 1, alternatives in A are only partially ordered with respect to the
weak preference relation , that is, we allow for the possibility that there are alternatives
a,b ∈ A such that not a wA b and not b wA a.I nt h a tc a s ew ew r i t eaAb and we say
that “the individual has ambiguous preferences with respect to choosing a over b and vice
versa”. Thus, we formalize ambiguity as a reﬂexive binary relation over two alternatives
with the interpretation that the individual is unable to say which alternative he (weakly)
prefers. Ambiguity, according to our understanding, is therefore a very diﬀerent concept
than indiﬀerence: an individual who is indiﬀerent between two alternatives, i.e., a ∼ b,
experiences no problem to simply choose one of these alternatives whereas an individual
who has ambiguous preferences about these two alternatives, i.e., aAb, has an incredibly
hard time to choose one alternative or the other.
Now focus on the weak preference relation º over opportunity sets. A preference
statement D º E with D,E ⊆ A will be read by us as “the individual ex ante prefers
the opportunity set D to the opportunity set E.” Recall that a chain is any non-empty
subset of A that is totally ordered by wA. In our further discussion we concentrate on
the subset of opportunity sets Do deﬁned as:
Do = {D ⊆ A|o ∈ D }.
Hence, Do is the set of those opportunity sets which contain the worst alternative.
2Depending on the context there might be alternative - and less drastic - interpretations of o. E.g.,
in the example presented in the introduction, the worst alternative can be interpreted as not pursuing
a doctoral degree, either because the applicant was not accepted to any of the universities, or because
he decided to reject all oﬀers.
8By C ⊆ Do we denote the set of all chains in Do with respect to the order wAon A.
Note that all of these chains except the trivial one, {o}, contain at least two alternatives
(this is the case, since o is comparable to every element of A). The generic element of
C is either denoted by h or by (x1 wA ... wA xn) such that x1 6= ... 6= xn and x1 ≡ o for
all (x1 wA ... wA xn) ∈ C.
Assumption 2: There exists a reﬂexive, transitive and complete binary relation º
over all elements of Do.
By the following assumption we presume a structural richness of A which excludes
uninteresting cases.
Assumption 33: For every x ∈ A t h e r ei ss o m ey ∈ A with x 6= y such that x wA y
or y wA x.
Since nature may choose an arbitrary subset of A, there exists a straightforward
notion of relevant states of nature that capture the period 1 uncertainty in our model,
namely all subsets of A containing the worst element o. The choice of an opportunity
set in period 1 can be understood as a Savage-act that assigns to each state of nature as
consequence the best alternative available for this given act and state of nature. However,
under our assumptions, there may not exist a best alternative since the decision-maker
may be confronted with ambiguous alternatives.
Consider, for example, the Savage-framework of a decision-situation where A =
{o,a,b,c} such that a ≺A b and a ≺A c but bAc. The interior cells of the following table
depict the best alternative the decision-maker can choose ex post whereby “?”d e n o t e s
an ambiguous choice situation in which the decision-maker is not able to say which of
h i sa l t e r n a t i v e sa th a n di sb e s t .
3Note that, besides assumption 3, we assume no structure on the set A.H o w e v e r ,i ti se a s yt os h o w
that every ﬁnite set Aof cardinality N together with the binary relations w and A can be mapped on
RN in such way that w is represented by the natural order on vectors and incomparable alternatives
are incomparable with respect to the natural ordering. (We thank Stefan Gerdjikov for this comment.)
9States of nature
o {o,a}{ o,b}{ o,c}{ o,a,b}{ o,a,c}{ o,c,b}{ o,a,b,c}
Chosen opportunity sets
{o,a} oa o o a a o a
{o,b} oo b o b o b b
{o,c} oo o c o c c c
{o,a,b} oa b o b a b b
{o,a,c} oa o c a c c c
{o,b,c} oo b c b c ??
{o,a,b,c} oa b c b c ??
In what follows we introduce our two central axioms – strong ambiguity aversion
and ﬂexibility of choice – which will eﬀectively narrow down the possible candidates
for preference-maximizing opportunity sets.
Deﬁnition: We say that the preference relation º over opportunity sets satisﬁes strong
ambiguity aversion if and only if, for all D ∈ Do,
D Â D ∪ {b}
if there is some a ∈ D such that aAb, b ∈ A.
This deﬁnition of strong ambiguity aversion formalizes our central idea that individ-
uals feel strictly more comfortable when there are less possibilities to end up in an am-
biguous choice situation. In the above example, the Savage-acts {o,b,c} and {o,a,b,c}
cannot be preference-maximizing whenever strong ambiguity aversion holds since we
have, e.g.,
(o ≺A b) Â (o ≺A b) ∪ {c} and
(o ≺A a ≺A b) Â (o ≺A a ≺A b) ∪ {c}.
To see that strong ambiguity aversion is indeed a rather strong assumption consider
the following example (suggested to us by an anonymous referee): Suppose x2 wA ... wA
x50 and y ≺A xj for j ∈ {3,...,50} whereas x2Ay. By strong ambiguity aversion,
the opportunity set {o,x2,...,x50} must be strictly preferred to the opportunity set
{o,y,x2,...,x50}. This is despite the fact that the ambiguity of the latter set seems to be
negligible since ex ante there is a vast number of alternatives that are strictly preferred to
10the alternative y. Since the individual ex ante perceives any element of Do as a possible
reality in the ex post situation, it is plausible that he may strictly prefer the opportunity
set {o,x2,...,x50} to {o,y,x2,...,x50} in order to avoid the unpleasant choice between
y and x2 if nature chooses {o,y,x2}. On the other hand, however, observe that the
opportunity set {o,x2,...,x50} would leave the individual with the worst alternative, o,
if nature chooses {o,y}. Since any alternative is, by assumption 1, strictly better than o,
the opportunity set {o,y,x2,...,x50} would have been, in retrospect, more favorable for
that particular move of nature. Strong ambiguity aversion therefore describes decision-
makers who would like to avoid ambiguous choice situations rather than guaranteeing
the existence of favorable alternatives.
The assumption of strong ambiguity aversion - as extreme as it is - has yet another
advantage. In our present approach, we take the preference relation on the set A as a
primitive which is known both to the decision-maker and the analyst. In an experimental
setting, however, both relations wA and º are subjective and have to be derived from
observable choices. Thus, whenever decision-makers express preferences wA that comply
with our assumption of strong ambiguity aversion, we are able to uniquely and completely
identify the incomparable pairs of alternatives. Our approach therefore entails a way of
testing for incomplete preferences º which is alternative to the existing approaches by
Danan and Ziegelmeyer (2004) and by Eliaz and Ok (2006).
Deﬁnition: W es a yt h a tt h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o nºover opportunity sets satisﬁes ﬂexi-
bility of choice if and only if, for all non-degenerate chains h := (x1 wA ... wA xn) ∈
C,
h º h\{xj}
for all j ∈ {2,...,n}.
Flexibility of choice has a straightforward justiﬁcation by our assumption that the
individual is ex ante uncertain about his possible choices in the ex post situation whereby
he perceives any subset of A containing o as a possible reality in the ex post situation. For
instance, the opportunity set {o,a,b} weakly dominates in our example the opportunity
sets {o,a} and {o,b} since it gives in each state of the world a consequence from the
set A that is at least as good and sometimes even strictly better. Flexibility of choice
translates such weak dominance relations in the above Savage-framework into preferences
over opportunity sets.
11When preferences over opportunity sets satisfy strong ambiguity aversion and ﬂex-
ibility of choice the decision situation of our example reduces to the following candi-
dates for preference-maximizing opportunity sets (neglecting possible indiﬀerence with
singleton-chains):
States of nature
o {o,a}{ o,b}{ o,c}{ o,a,b}{ o,a,c}{ o,c,b}{ o,a,b,c}
Chosen opportunity sets
{o,a,b} oa b o b a b b
{o,a,c} oa o c a c c c
This reduced table also demonstrates that the Savage-framework is inappropriate to
determine preference-maximizing opportunity sets in our model. Any decision theory
– such as subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) or Choquet expected utility
theory, e.g. Gilboa (1987) – that separates between the utility of consequences and
decision weights referring to the likelihood of events stipulates that in any state diﬀerent
alternatives must be comparable. But the decision-maker of our example is not able
to compare the consequences of his opportunity set choices when the realized state is
{o,c,b} or {o,a,b,c}. Hence, incompleteness of preferences, which is a central feature
of our model, cannot be meaningfully captured by the Savage-framework.
In the next section we therefore present our proposal for a utility representation of
preferences over chains, e.g., (o ≺A a ≺A b) and (o ≺A a ≺A c) which does not require
any formation of beliefs or likelihood considerations about the realization of states.
4 An additive representation result
This section deﬁnes our main technical axiom, cancellation, cf. Kraft, Pratt, and Seiden-
berg (1959), Fishburn (1996), Conder and Slinko (2003), which guarantees an additive
utility representation of preferences over totally ordered opportunity sets that have at
least two members.
First, we proceed with further deﬁnitions:
• Deﬁne the multiset generating operator T as follows: for all chains (x1 wA ... wA xn) ∈
C,
T (x1 wA ... wA xn): ={o,x2,x 2,...,xn−1,x n−1,x n}
That is, for every (x1 wA ... wA xn) ∈ C, T (x1 wA ... wA xn) is a special case of
a multiset,i nw h i c ht h es a m ee l e m e n tx ∈ {o,x2,...,xn−1,x n} appears twice in
T (x1 wA ... wA xn),i fa n do n l yi f ,x1 wA x wA xn with x 6= o,xn.
12• Let #{x ∈ T (h)} denote the number of occurrences of x in T (h).
Deﬁnition: We say that the preference relation º over opportunity sets satisﬁes can-
cellation,i fa n do n l yi f ,f o re v e r yp a i rh1,h 2,...,hm and g1,g 2,...,gm of ﬁnite
sequences of chains in C such that
m X
j=1
#{x ∈ T (hj)} =
m X
j=1
#{x ∈ T (gj)} for all x ∈ A,
preferences hj º gj for all j ∈ {1,...,m} imply that hj ∼ gj for all j ∈ {1,...,m}.
Lemma:
• If the preference relation º over opportunity sets satisﬁes cancellation and
ﬂexibility of choice, then preferences º over chains with at least two en-




U ((x1 wA ... wA xn)) =
n−1 X
k=1
f (xk,x k+1),( 1 )
where f : A×A→ R
+
0 must satisfy the triangle-inequality:
f (x,y)+f (y,z) ≥ f (x,z)
for all x,y,z ∈ A.
• Conversely, if f satisﬁes the triangle-inequality, then any function (1) rep-
resents preferences º over members of C such that the preference relation º
over opportunity sets satisﬁes cancellation and ﬂexibility of choice.
P r o o fo ft h el e m m a :Relegated to the appendix.
Corollary 1: If the preference relation º over opportunity sets satisﬁes cancellation,
then preferences º over members of C also satisfy:
independence of connected chains: For all chains in C:
13• (o ≺A a wA ... wA b), (o ≺A d wA ... wA e) and
(o ≺A b wA ... wA c) ∼ (o ≺A e wA ... wA f)
(o ≺A b) ∼ (o ≺A e)
(o ≺A a wA ... wA b) º (o ≺A d wA ... wA e) iﬀ (2)
(o ≺A a wA ... wA b wA ... wA c) º (o ≺A d wA ... wA e wA ... wA f).( 3 )
• (o ≺A a wA ... wA b), (o ≺A e wA ... wA f) and
(o ≺A b wA ... wA c) ∼ (o ≺A d wA ... wA e)
(o ≺A b) ∼ (o ≺A e)
(o ≺A a wA ... wA b) º (o ≺A d wA ... wA e) iﬀ (4)
(o ≺A a wA ... wA b wA ... wA c) º (o ≺A d wA ... wA e wA ... wA f).( 5 )
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y1 :Relegated to the appendix.
Corollary 2: Consider a preference relation º over opportunity sets which satisﬁes
cancellation and ﬂexibility of choice. Then the following two statements are
equivalent:
(i) for any chain h and any a, a0 ∈ A such that
h ∪ {a} ∈ C
h ∪ {a
0} ∈ C
h ∪ {a} ∼ h ∪ {a
0}
and h Â h0 for all h,h0 ∈ C with h0 ⊂⊂ h.
(ii) T h ep r e f e r e n c er e l a t i o nº over opportunity sets in C can be represented by
(1) where f is the discrete metric, i.e., for all x,y ∈ A, f (x,y)=1if x 6= y
and f (x,y)=0otherwise.
Proof of corollary 2: The proof is straightforward and therefore left to the reader.
(Proceed by induction over the number of entries and observe that if (1) represents
14preferences on C where f is the discrete metric, then h Â (∼)h0 for all h,h0 ∈ C iﬀ h has
strictly more (equally many) entries than (as) h0.)
Remark. The assumption of cancellation is closely related to the independence
principle (or to Savage’s, (1954) sure thing principle within the context of deriving
additive probability measures). Since we are not convinced by the appeal (descriptive
as well as normative) of the independence principle, we have chosen a formulation of
cancellation which gives the convenient additive utility representation (1) while it admits
for speciﬁcw e a k e n i n go ft h ei n d e p e n d e n c ep r i n c i p l ea tt h es a m et i m e .F o re x a m p l e ,i f
we had alternatively deﬁned cancellation with respect to the number of occurrences of
alternatives x in the chains hj and gj in C, the following preferences over opportunity
sets would be excluded
(o ≺A a1 wA a2) Â (o ≺A b1 wA b2) (6a)
(o ≺A a3 wA a4) º (o ≺A b3 wA b4) (6b)
(o ≺A a3) ∼ (o ≺A b3) (6c)
(o ≺A b1 wA b2 wA b3 wA b4) º (o ≺A a1 wA a2 wA a3 wA a4) (6d)
However, preferences (6a)-(6d) do not violate our concept of cancellation since it refers
to the number of occurrences of alternatives x in the multisets T (hj) and T (gj),f o r
j ∈ {1,...,m}. Preferences (6a)-(6d) are, therefore, representable by (1) as follows:
f (o,a1)+f (a1,a 2) >f (o,b1)+f (b1,b 2)
f (o,a3)+f (a3,a 4) ≥ f (o,b3)+f (b3,b 4)
f (o,a3)=f (o,b3)
f (o,b1)+f (b1,b 2)+f (b2,b 3)+f (b3,b 4) ≥ f (o,a1)+f (a1,a 2)+f (a2,a 3)+f (a3,a 4)
Clearly, this system of inequalities holds for a suﬃciently large diﬀerence f (b2,b 3) −
f (a2,a 3).
Thus, while our concept of cancellation implies the independence principle for con-
nected chains (cf. corollary 1), it does not entail the independence principle for arbitrary
chains. In our framework, the evaluation of, e.g., the opportunity set
(o ≺A a1 wA a2 wA a3 wA a4)
is not separable into evaluations of opportunity sets (o ≺A a1 wA a2) and (o ≺A a3 wA a4)
because we allow for the possibility that the joint appearance of a2 and a3 in the op-
portunity set (o ≺A a1 wA a2 wA a3 wA a4) might have some inﬂuence on the overall
evaluation of this opportunity set. We do not necessarily believe that this weakening of
15the independence principle is the most sensible one, and we consider it a topic for future
research to look for alternative approaches. Nevertheless, we think that our concept of
cancellation has, ﬁrstly, the pragmatic advantage that it stands for a, in our opinion,
desirable generalization of the independence principle and, secondly, it also admits for
the very convenient utility representation as derived in the above lemma.
5 Preference maximizing opportunity sets
In this section, we derive our main result, which characterizes the opportunity sets that
a welfare-maximizing social planner would like to implement. Before we present the
according characterization theorem, recall that a function δ : A×A→ R
+
0 is a metric
on A,i fa n do n l yi f ,δ satisﬁe st h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e ep r o p e r t i e sf o ra l la,b,c ∈ A:
1. a = b implies δ(a,b)=0and a 6= b implies δ(a,b) > 0
2. δ(a,b)=δ(b,a)
3. δ(a,b)+δ(b,c) ≥ δ(a,c) (triangle-inequality)
The following result identiﬁes preference-maximizing opportunity sets as maximiz-
ers of a utility function which sums up the distances of its ordered elements for some
appropriate metric imposed on all possible choices.
A characterization theorem for preference maximizing opportunity sets:
• If the preference relation º over opportunity sets satisﬁes strong ambiguity
aversion, cancellation,a n dﬂexibility of choice, then an opportunity set
D ∈ Do maximizes the preference relation º over opportunity sets, if and
only if, D := (o ≺A a wA ... wA b) ∈ C such that for some metric δ on A:




δ (xk,x k+1) (7)
• If a chain (o ≺A a wA ... wA b) ∈ C maximizes the r.h.s. of (7) for an arbi-
trary metric δ on A then (o ≺A a wA ... wA b) maximizes some preferences
º over opportunity sets satisfying strong ambiguity aversion, ﬂexibility
of choice and cancellation.
Proof: At ﬁrst observe that, by strong ambiguity aversion, any preference maximiz-
ing opportunity set must be some chain: taking away alternatives from the opportunity
set is strictly preferred as long as not all alternatives are comparable, i.e., as long as the
16remaining alternatives are not some chain. Moreover, by assumption 3 and ﬂexibility of
c h o i c e ,t h e r ee x i s tn o n - d e g e n e r a t ec h a i n sw h i c ha r ep r e f e r e n c em a x i m i z i n g .T h ec h a r a c -
terization theorem then follows from the lemma, since any function f in (1), satisfying
the triangle-inequality, can be extended to some metric δ on A.
Corollary 3: Consider a preference relation º over opportunity sets which satisﬁes
strong ambiguity aversion, cancellation,a n dﬂexibility of choice.S u p p o s e
further that the following assumptions are fulﬁlled:
• for any chain h ∈ C and any a, a0 ∈ A such that
h ∪ {a} ∈ C
h ∪ {a
0} ∈ C
h ∪ {a} ∼ h ∪ {a
0}
and h Â h0 for all h,h0 ∈ C with h0 ⊂⊂ h.
Then an opportunity set D ∈ Do maximizes the preference relation º over opportunity
sets, if and only if, D := (o ≺A a wA ... wA b) ∈ C and there does not exist a
chain h ∈ C such that h has strictly more entries than D.
Proof: Since statement (i) of corollary 2 is satisﬁed, δ denotes in (7) the discrete
metric so that for all (x1 wA ... wA xn) ∈ C
n−1 X
k=1
δ(xk,x k+1)=n − 1.
Thus, the utility of opportunity sets in C is strictly increasing in the number of alter-
natives contained in these chains, whereas the decision-maker is indiﬀerent between any
two non-degenerate chains containing the same number of alternatives.
6 An illustrative example: Ambiguity arising from
incomparable features
In this section, we show that strong ambiguity aversion does not put severe restrictions
on actually observed behavior. In particular, we demonstrate how orderings on A which
diﬀer with respect to their incomplete parts can generate diﬀerent preference-maximizing
17opportunity sets. Intuitively, the more incomparable pairs of alternatives the set A
contains, the fewer elements are included in the preference maximizing set.
In the following, we focus on a speciﬁc class of preferences over alternatives such that
all alternatives exhibit a comparable as well as an incomparable component from the
decision-maker’s point of view.
Assumption 4: Let A ⊂ Λ×Γ∪{o} such that o ∈ A and suppose that the preference
relation wA is complete on Λ ×{ γ} ∪ {o} ∩ A, for any γ ∈ Γ.
We will interpret λ ∈ Λ, respectively γ ∈ Γ,a st h ecomparable, respectively incompa-
rable, component of the alternative (λ,γ) ∈ A. Accordingly, we will say that Λ collects
the comparable features whereas Γ collects the incomparable features of the alternatives
in A. While the decision-maker can, by assumption 4, easily compare alternatives that
share identical incomparable features, he cannot easily choose between alternatives hav-
ing diﬀerent incomparable features.
Recall our initial example of a college graduate applying for a PhD pro-
gram whereby:
Λ := prestige × tuition × scholarship
Γ := pressure to perform.
Thus, such a student can easily compare diﬀerent values of prestige, tuition
and scholarship but he encounters severe problems to compare diﬀerent de-
grees of pressure to perform.
In what follows we present two benchmark cases where diﬀerent incomparable fea-
tures result in incomplete preferences over alternatives.
Case I: Weak ambiguity perception
Deﬁnition: We say that wA expresses weak ambiguity perception if, for all (λ,γ),(λ
0,γ0) ∈
A, (λ,γ)A(λ
0,γ0) if and only if λ = λ
0 and γ 6= γ0.
(Example continued.) Suppose a graduate student, exhibiting weak am-
biguity perception, has to decide between the PhD programs oﬀered by Cor-
nell and by Duke, respectively. For the sake of argument, assume that the
18student perceives the comparable features - prestige, tuition, scholarship -
of both programs as identical whereas he expects less pressure to perform
under the Cornell than under the Duke program. Since, by assumption, he
cannot make up his mind whether a low or a high pressure to perform would
suit him better, he is caught in an ambiguous choice situation. On the other
hand, if he is confronted with the choice between Cornell oﬀering a higher
scholarship than Duke - with otherwise identical speciﬁcations of the compa-
rable features - he would have no diﬃculties to decide for the Cornell PhD
program.
Obviously, if a decision-maker expresses weak ambiguity perception, and the compa-
rable features λ ∈ Λ were diﬀerent for all alternatives (λ,γ) ∈ A,t h e nA itself would be
a chain and therefore the unique maximizer of (7) for any distance function δ on A×A.
(Example continued.) If every PhD program oﬀered distinct comparable
features λ, a graduate student with weak ambiguity perception would prefer
to apply to all PhD programs.
Case II: Strong ambiguity perception
Deﬁnition: We say that wA expresses strong ambiguity perception if, for all (λ,γ),(λ
0,γ0) ∈
A, (λ,γ)A(λ
0,γ0) if and only if γ 6= γ0.
(Example continued.) In contrast to weak ambiguity perception, strong
ambiguity perception additionally requires that the graduate student cannot
compare PhD programs with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of prestige, tuition and
scholarship whenever they include diﬀerent levels of the incomparable feature
pressure to perform.
Under the assumptions of our representation theorem, the possible candidates for a
preference maximizing opportunity set are given as the chains
Λ ×{ γ}, γ ∈ Γ.
That is, (i) for any γ ∈ Γ we can ﬁnd some distance function δ on A×Asuch that
Λ ×{ γ} is preference-maximizing and (ii) for any given distance function δ on A×A
only some set Λ ×{ γ} with γ ∈ Γ will be a maximizer of (7).
(Example continued.) A graduate student with strong ambiguity per-
ception prefers to apply to multiple PhD programs given that they im-








, i(γ) ∈ N,f o ra l lλi(γ),λi(γ)+1 ∈ Λ, λi(γ) 6= λi(γ)+1.



































holds for all γ0 ∈ Γ,w h e r eλi(γ) and λi(γ)+1 denote diﬀerent comparable
features of the PhD programs.
We could obtain similar results by keeping the ordering wA constant, while vary-
ing the attitude of the decision-maker towards ambiguity. This alternative approach,
however, presents a problem. If a decision-maker expresses the preference:
D ∪ {a}ÂD
for some a/ ∈ D,w ew o u l dn o tk n o ww h e t h e rt h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a ta is comparable
to all elements in D or whether the decision-maker ﬁnds that the utility derived from
adding a to the set compensates for the ambiguity resulting from a being incomparable
to some elements of D. As long as we do not think of incomparability as an objective
property, it will be impossible to disentangle these two eﬀects without using strong
additional assumptions on preferences. In contrast, the assumption of strong ambiguity
aversion allows us to clearly separate the eﬀects of ﬂexibility and ambiguity and to
uniquely identify the incomplete part of wA by observing choices between menus.
7 Concluding remarks and outlook
This paper describes the optimization problem of a social planner who would like to
maximize the welfare of decision-makers that dislike ambiguous choice situations. We
identify conditions on preferences which imply that optimal opportunity sets contain
only comparable alternatives and are maximal with respect to this property. As our
main formal result we characterize the preference-maximizing opportunity set as a max-
imizer of a utility function which sums up the distances of its ordered elements for some
appropriate metric imposed on all alternatives.
Our results are driven by the assumption of strong aversion towards ambiguity. We
are far from insisting that this assumption describes a behavioral pattern which is most
prevalent in practice. We argue, however, that it captures the general idea that peo-
ple are averse to making choices between incomparable alternatives. We consider this
20benchmark case as a ﬁrst step towards developing a more general theory of ambigu-
ity aversion, in which a range of attitudes towards incomparable alternatives could be
modelled. The assumption of strong ambiguity aversion by far simpliﬁes our analysis
and allows us to draw conclusions about preference maximizing opportunity sets which
would not be valid under diﬀerent assumptions. Interestingly enough, we ﬁnd that the
conclusions which we reach can be supported by institutions found in everyday life.
While the scope of this paper is restricted to the characterization of welfare-maximizing
opportunity sets, it would be compelling – from a decision-theoretic point of view – to
derive a complete functional representation of preferences over opportunity sets. Such
a representation would enable us to model trade-oﬀs between preferences for ﬂexibility
on chains and ambiguity aversion with respect to incomparable alternatives.
To see how such trade-oﬀs naturally emerge in our model,let us once again return
to the example we presented in section 3. Suppose x2 wA ... wA x50 and y ≺A xj for
j ∈ {3,...,50} whereas x2Ay. In general, the decision-maker will have to trade-oﬀ the
additional ﬂexibility obtained by adding y to the set versus its incomparability to x2.I f
y i sa d d e dt ot h es e t ,an e wm a x i m a lc h a i n ,(o,y,x3,...,x50), emerges. Note that this new
maximal chain coincides with the old one on the set (x3...x50). Hence, it seems intuitive
to measure the additional ﬂexibility by the subjective length of the chain (o,y,x3).I ft h i s
chain is suﬃciently long according to δ, the additional ﬂexibility introduced by adding
y will compensate for the ambiguity resulting from the incomparability between y and
x2.
Note that we measure the subjectively perceived ambiguity implicitly by the amount
of ﬂexibility necessary to compensate for it. Indeed, the length of the newly added chain
(o,y,x3) necessary to make the decision-maker indiﬀerent between
{o,x2...x50} and
{o,y,x2...x50}
can serve as a measure of ambiguity-aversion of the decision-maker. Especially, for
an ambiguity-neutral decision-maker this length will be 0. Such a person will express
preferences
D ∪ {x}  D,
irrespectively of the number of elements in D deemed incomparable to x. In contrast,
for the strongly ambiguity averse decision-maker of our present approach, the length
necessary to compensate for the additional ambiguity will be larger – according to the
decision-maker’s subjective metric δ – than that of the longest chain in A .
In terms of our analysis, both ambiguity neutrality and strong aversion towards
ambiguity seem to represent rather extreme cases. It would be interesting to come up
21with a system of axioms which would allow to capture the whole scale of attitude towards
ambiguity ranging from the ambiguity neutral to the strongly ambiguity averse decision-
maker. We intend to address these decision-theoretic issues in subsequent research.
Appendix
Proof of the lemma:
First, note that cancellation is a suﬃcient condition (e.g., Fishburn, 1996) for the
existence of a utility representation V of a complete pre-ordering z on the set Γ :=
{T (h) | h ∈ C} such that there exist utility numbers u : A → R with







ﬂexibility of choice further implies that these numbers can be chosen to be non-negative
since the addition of a further element to a chain should weakly increase its evaluation.
Now deﬁne the function f (xj,x j+1): =u(xj)+u(xj+1) for all j ∈ {1,...,n− 1}.L e th ∼
(Â)h0 iﬀ T (h) ∼ (>)(T (h0)) for all h,h0 ∈ C so that the sets C and Γ are homeomorphic
whereby, (8) becomes (1). In order to see that any such function f must satisfy the
triangle-inequality, observe that
V ({o,a,c})=u(o)+u(a)+u(a)+u(c)
≤ u(o)+u(a)+u(a)+u(b)+u(b)+u(c)=V ({o,a,a,b,b,c}) ⇔
U ((o ≺A a wA c)) = f (o,a)+f (a,c)
≤ f (o,a)+f (a,b)+f (b,c)=U ((o ≺A a wA b wA c)) ⇔
f (a,c) ≤ f (a,b)+f (b,c).
Which proves the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h el e m m a .
Since cancellation and ﬂexibility of choice (e.g., Fishburn, 1996) are also necessary
conditions for an additive utility representation (8), the second part of the lemma easily
follows. For a given function f,l e t
u(x1):= f (x1,x 2) − u(x2)
...
u(xn−1):= f (xn−1,x n) − u(xn)
Just choose some non-negative u(xn) ≤ f (xn−1,x n), so that the remaining utility num-
bers u(xj) are uniquely determined for all j ∈ {1,...,n− 1}. Observe that we have for
all x wA y wA z
f (x,z)=f (x,y)+f (y,z) − 2 · u(y)
22Thus, if f satisﬁes the triangle-inequality, then u(xj) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {1,...,n}.A s a
consequence, (1) becomes a representation (8) of preferences that satisfy cancellation
and ﬂexibility of choice. 
Proof of corollary 1: The utility representation (1) implies for all (o ≺A a wA ... wA b),
(o ≺A d wA ... wA e) satisfying
(o ≺A b wA ... wA c) ∼ (o ≺A e wA ... wA f)
(o ≺A b) ∼ (o ≺A e)
the equalities
U (o ≺A b wA ... wA c)=U (o ≺A e wA ... wA f)
U (o ≺A b)=U (o ≺A e).
Hence,
U ((o ≺A a wA ... wA b wA ... wA c)) = U (o ≺A a wA ... wA b)+U (o ≺A b wA ... wA c)
−U (o ≺A b)
= U (o ≺A a wA ... wA b)+U (o ≺A e wA ... wA f)
−U (o ≺A e)
≥ U (o ≺A d wA ... wA e)+U (o ≺A e wA ... wA f)
−U (o ≺A e),
iﬀ
U (o ≺A a wA ... wA b) ≥ U (o ≺A d wA ... wA e),o r
(o ≺A a wA ... wA b) º (o ≺A d wA ... wA e).
Proceed analogously to prove the equivalence of (4) and (5). Note that ﬂexibility of
choice is not needed for the additive representation, but only insures that the utility
numbers u(xj)deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 1 are positive, a fact that is not used in
the proof of the corollary.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